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Catching two European birds with one renewable stone: 
Mitigating climate change and Eurozone crisis by an energy 
transition 
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Abstract 
The threat of climate change and other risks for ecosystems and human health 
require a transition of the energy system from fossil fuels towards renewable 
energies and higher eficiency. The European geographical periphery, and 
specificaly Southern Europe, has considerable potential for renewable energies. At 
the same time it is also stricken by high levels of public debt and unemployment, 
and struggles with austerity policies as consequences of the Eurozone crisis. 
Modeling studies find a broad optimum when searching for a cost-optimal 
deployment of renewable energy instalations. This alows for the consideration of 
additional policy objectives. Simultaneously, economists argue for an increase in 
public expenditure to compensate for the slump in private investments and to 
provide economic stimulus. This paper combines these two perspectives. We assess 
the potential for renewable energies in the European periphery, and highlight 
relevant costs and barriers for a large-scale transition to a renewable energy system. 
We find that a European energy transition with a high-level of renewable energy 
instalations in the periphery could act as an economic stimulus, decrease trade 
deficits, and possibly have positive employment effects. Our analysis also suggests 
that country- specific conditions and policy frameworks require member state 
policies to play a leading role in fostering an energy transition. This 
notwithstanding, a stronger European-wide coordination of regulatory frameworks 
and supportive funding schemes would leverage country-specific action. Renewed 
solidarity could be the most valuable outcome of a commonly designed and 
implemented European energy transition. 
Keywords: Energy transition, renewable energies, Europe, multiple-objective policy 
framework. 
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1.Introduction
Avoiding anthropogenic climate change and risks for ecosystems and human health 
cal for a thorough transformation of the global energy system from fossil fuels 
towards a more sustainable pathway (Graßl et al. 2003; Schubert et al. 2008; IPCC 
2011; IPCC 2007; Johansson et al. 2012)9. Sustainability criteria translate into 
multiple policy targets for the energy sector, such as climate change mitigation, 
reduction of local environmental damages, energy security, phase-out of nuclear 
power plants, “green” economic growth associated with green jobs and poverty 
reduction, as wel as maintaining or achieving a sufficient food supply. A 
meaningful policy analysis requires a multiple-objective, multiple-externality 
framework that explicitly accounts for the dynamic interdependencies (Edenhofer, 
Hirth, et al. 2013; Edenhofer, Seyboth, et al. 2013) and that acknowledges 
potentialy considerable uncertainties and the consideration of impacts that are not 
wel quantifiable (Heazle 2010; Sarewitz 2004; Tribe, Scheling, and Voss 1976). 
The European Union’s (EU) climate and energy strategy rests on explicit targets 
for reducing greenhouse gas emission, promoting renewable energy sources and 
increasing energy eficiency (the so-caled 20-20-20 targets). These targets have 
been underpinned by a variety of EU and Member State policy instruments, most 
notably the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) in the utility sector and 
country-specific support schemes for renewable energies. Primary measures to 
address these policy targets include the massive deployment of renewable energy 
sources, an increase in energy eficiency, and the associated changes in distribution, 
storage and usage paterns, shortly also referred to as energy transition (IPCC 2011). 
These efforts notwithstanding, the political reality places the long-term chalenge of 
climate change mitigation on the back burner. The Eurozone crisis, which involves a 
sovereign debt crisis, a banking crisis and a severe and enduring recession, 
dominates the European discourse (Panico and Purificato 2013). The crisis has 
afected al EU Member States but particularly those in the geographical periphery. 
Energy transition modeling suggests that a cost-effective decarbonization of the 
European electricity production and distribution system can be achieved by 
transitioning on different pathways in terms of technology choice, spatial 
distribution of production capacity and the degree of connectivity between different 
Member States (European Commission 2012b; Knopf, Bakken, et al. 2013; Schmid 
and Knopf 2013). It is the central argument of this paper that this degree of freedom 
in designing an energy transition offers significant leeway to maximize welfare from 
co-effects of renewable deployment, thus simultaneously addressing other public 
policy targets than climate change mitigation. Hence, depending on its design, a 
9 RE: Renewable Energies; PV: Photovoltaic; BOS: Balance of System Costs;
LCOE: Levelized Cost of Electricity; EMF: Energy Modeling Forum; TFEU: Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union; NREAPs: National Renewable Energy Action 
Plans; EU ETS: EU Emissions Trading Scheme; ACER: Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators; ENTSO-E: European Network of Transmission System Operators for
Electricity 
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European energy transition may also help European economies to recover by 
fostering economic growth, creating jobs, providing energy security, and building 
trust. 
We argue that European renewable policy should be designed such that the 
respective co-benefits are realized predominantly in peripheral countries. This 
argument rests on three rationales. 1) An argument of economic efficiency: A crash 
of economies in the periphery wil also affect those countries that are currently wel 
of. If the use of direct means of economic policy, such as fiscal and monetary 
instruments, is limited (e.g. for political reasons), the promotion of renewable 
energy investments in the periphery may be understood as a surrogate for such 
policy (Gilingham and Sweeney 2010; Lehmann and Gawel 2013). 2) An argument 
of justice and fairness: A joint European effort to promote renewable energy 
investments in the periphery may provide a fairer distribution of wealth within 
Europe. This is especialy relevant in a unified European economy where central 
regions such as the Benelux countries, Germany and Northern Italy profit from 
agglomeration dynamics and without the periphery the center would not boast such 
impressive agglomeration dynamics. 3) An argument of political feasibility: Co-
benefits in terms of economic development or trust building may be a precondition 
for governments to be wiling to support a European energy transition (Edenhofer, 
Knopf, and Luderer 2013). 
To date, the questions of how to design a European energy transition and how to 
help the European periphery overcome the debt crisis have been analyzed in entirely 
separated strands of literature. The New Economic Geography points out that in a 
unified economic zone, the geographical core profits at the expense of the 
geographical periphery due to agglomeration economics (Fujita, Krugman, and 
Venables 1999; Krugman 1991). On the debt crisis, one strand of literature argues 
that deep recessions, accompanied with the bursting of property bubbles, require 
increased government investments to compensate for the saving demands on 
business (Eggertsson and Krugman 2012; Koo 2011). Lending and investments into 
those countries that suffer most from the debt crisis are seen as most promising to 
elicit growth and employment effects (Griffith-Jones et al. 2012). In a very different 
strand of literature, the prospective of a European energy transition as driven by 
climate change mitigation has been explored in a recent special issue (Knopf, 
Bakken, et al. 2013; Knopf, Chen, et al. 2013). The technical and sustainable 
potential and options had already been comprehensively explored by Graßl et al. 
(Graßl et al. 2003). The policy status and further options were also subject to 
scrutiny in recent analyses (Neuhoff, Boyd, and Glachant 2012; Lehmann and 
Gawel 2013). Special emphasis has been given to the European ETS (Verbruggen, 
Moomaw, and Nyboer 2011; Chesney and Taschini 2012; Neuhoff et al. 2012; 
Schäfer and Creutzig 2008). In a first, more holistic approach an edited volume 
studied the German energy transition from a behavioral economic, engineering, 
legal, philosophical, and political perspectives (Felix Creutzig and Goldschmidt 
2008). Nevertheless, a common denominator of these analyses is that they implicitly 
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consider climate change mitigation as the predominant public policy chalenge. This 
paper, in contrast, contextualizes a European transition of the energy system – 
driven by climate change mitigation concerns – in the broader framework of 
European chalenges, notably the deep recession and debt crisis in the European 
periphery and its lack of solidarity. Similar to Leggewie (Leggewie 2012), we see an 
opportunity in fostering renewable energies in the European periphery, an argument 
that we substantiate with quantitative analysis. 
The scope of this paper is restricted to the analysis of electricity generation and 
distribution as this sector of the energy system is currently the most dynamic one in 
terms of decarbonization. The outline is as folows. Section 2 investigates the 
technical and economic potential for renewable electricity generation across Europe, 
and particularly in peripheral Member States. Section 3 evaluates the potential co-
efects of a European energy transition, with a special focus on which additional co-
benefits could be realized by a transition that specificaly targets co-benefits in the 
periphery. Section 4 turns to analyzing the diferent barriers to a (periphery-focused) 
European energy transition, describes measures of how these barriers could be 
overcome and the policies needed, and evaluates the options in regard to feasibility 
and accordance to diferent welfare perspectives. Finaly, Section 5 concludes in 
positioning the issue of a European energy transition in the periphery into the larger 
context of a common project for Europe. To substantiate our analysis, we explore 
the specific cases of Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Poland in detail, representing 
countries that are hit by the debt crisis and where renewable deployment would 
make a difference, but have quite different paterns in terms of economic activity, 
renewable energy resources and conducted energy transitions.  
2.Potential for renewable electricity generation in
Europe 
As a basis for the analysis of a European energy transition, it is important to know 
what is the potential for electricity generation from renewable energy (RE) across 
Europe, and particularly in its periphery? Potential estimates need to be 
diferentiated between the technical, economic and market potential (Verbruggen, 
Moomaw, and Nyboer 2011): The technical potential refers to the theoretical 
amount of renewable electricity generation that could be obtained with the best 
available techniques under given natural conditions and using the maximum 
available land area, irrespective of cost considerations. The economic potential is 
defined as the socialy optimal benchmark deployment level of renewable 
technologies when al corresponding social costs and benefits, including negative 
externalities and co‐benefits, are taken into account. The market potential is the 
amount of renewable energy use that market participants pursue as investments 
under given market conditions. 
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The folowing elaborates on the underlying argument why the deployment of 
RE technologies in the European periphery can be a cost-effective and -eficient 
solution to decarbonizing the European electricity system. Section 2.1 elaborates on 
the abundant technical potential of wind and solar energy in Europe and discusses 
prospects of technology development. Section 2.2 explores model-based estimates 
of the economic potential of RE and discusses issues that are not, or cannot be 
represented in the models but may be highly relevant for assessing the effects of a 
European energy transition. 
2.1 Technical potential and technology costs 
The most important RE electricity generation technologies in Europe are based on 
solar irradiation (i.e. solar photovoltaic and solar thermal power plants), and wind 
energy, both onshore and offshore. Biomass, hydro power and geothermal energy 
also play a role, however, their potential is regionaly limited and in the case of 
biomass also subject to land competition with food production and biodiversity. 
From a resources point of view, a fuly renewable electricity system in Europe is 
possible, as the technical potential of RE is abundant (Sachverständigenrat für 
Umweltfragen (SRU) 2011). In order to visualize the regional distribution of solar 
irradiation and wind energy, Figure 1 ilustrates annual ful load hours of wind 
turbines and solar photovoltaic (PV) modules based on meteorological data and 
specific technology assumptions. Even though ful load hours may be higher in the 
future due to technology advancements, a distinct patern emerges: Wind potentials 
are the highest in the northern periphery and solar potentials are particularly high on 
the Iberian Peninsula, Italy and south-eastern Europe. 
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Figure  1. Annual ful load hours of wind turbines (left) and optimaly inclined PV 
modules (right). Source: Figures 4-5 and 4-10 in Held (Held 2010) and reproduced 
in Hoefnagels et al.  (Hoefnagels et al. 2011). Some of the area judged to be not 
suitable for wind energy might stil show substantial potential (Hoefnagels et al. 
2011; Rathmann et al. 2011). 
Table 1. Electricity from Renewables and Potentials in six EU member states. The 
electricity consumption of six EU member states and their year 2011 electricity 
trade balance is shown in the top two rows. The folowing three blocks describe in 
three rows each the countries’ current electricity production per renewable energy 
source, its technical potential and the current production as the percentage of 
potential. (a) The final electricity consumption defined by the IEA excludes energy 
industry’s own use. (b) The 2012 Wind Power Share denotes the electric energy that 
the wind power instalations by 2012 would produce in a meteorologicaly normal 
wind year (“Wind in Power, 2012 European Statistics” 2013) .(c) The estimation of
technical potential for electricity from wind is based on seven different land covers 
and their respective suitability for wind power instalations, and average wind speed 
distributions. Environmental factors and social preferences are not taken into 
account. When accounted for designated nature areas, the technical potential 
reported would decrease by 14% on an European average (EEA 2009). (d) The 
bioenergy potentials are based on (de Wit and Faaij 2010). A conversion factor of 
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1/3 from biomass to electricity is assumed. (e) The 2012 Technical PV potential is 
calculated based on Braun et al. (2012), using population and infrastructure-based 
estimations of PV capacities. These are applied to country-specific solar PV yield 
data of Breyer and Schmid (2010). The technical potential for PV reported here only 
assumes use of readily available surfaces, such as on roofs or closely along 
motorways. This estimation is much more conservative than the one used for wind 
energy. 
Greece Ireland Italy Poland Spain 
2011 Final Electricity 
Consumption 
TWh yr-1 
(IEA 2011) (a) 52 25 302 122 234 
2011 Electricity Trade 
Balance 
As share of final 
consumption 
(IEA 2011) 
- 6 - 2 - 15 4 2,6 
Win
d 




(EWEA 2012) (b) 
6 13 5 3 16 
2030 Technical Wind 
Electricity Potential 
TWh yr-1 
(EEA 2009)(c) 1430 2350 2150 4000 3150 
Technical Potential 
used in 2012 
Share of 2030 







(IEA 2011) 0.21 0.34 8.63 7.60 3.81 
2030 Technical 
Potential TWh yr
-1 (d) 13 6 44 132 68 
2030 Technical 
Potential used in 2011 
Share of 2030 




 2011 Electricity Production from Solar 
TWh yr-1 
(IEA 2011) 0.6 0.0 10.8 0.0 8.7 
2012 PV Technical 
Potential TWh yr
-1 (e) 119 35 429 241 516 
Technical Solar 
Potential used in 2011 
Share of 2012 
potential 0.5 0.0 2.5 0.0 1.7 
Wind is in many situations, but depending on the remaining availability of 
hydro, currently the most cost competitive renewable energy technology in the 
electricity market. The levelized costs of electricity from wind energy are between 
4-8€c/kWh in many locations (Lantz, Wiser, and Hand 2012; EEA 2009). Ofshore 
wind instalations are currently more expensive, but are experiencing a steep 
learning curve (EEA 2009). The total cost of onshore instalations is mostly 
determined by the turbine price itself (ca. 80 of total costs), while operations and 
maintenance account for about 1.2-1.5 €c/kWh. Hence, the profitability of wind 
energy mainly depends on the availability of wind. The profitability threshold is 
usualy assumed to be around 2300 ful load hours (EEA 2009) (cf. Figure 1). At 
high penetration levels of wind power of 40 or higher, costs for grid expansion and 
reserve capacity become important, but are not wel estimated (EEA 2009). EEA 
(EEA 2009) summarises grid extension costs to be anywhere between 0-10€c/kWh, 
and costs for reserve capacity at 2-4€c/kWh. Overal, wind energy is often cost-
competitive without subsidies. The technical potential would alow for an increase 
of about 2 orders of magnitude compared to current deployment levels, theoreticaly 
satisfying current electricity demand (Table 1). In practice, local environmental 
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impact due to the instalation of operation of wind turbines, however, cannot be 
ignored (Leung and Yang 2012), leading together with local protests and economic 
consideration to considerably lower projected deployment rates (see 2.2). 
The technical potential for bioenergy in Europe is significantly below that of 
wind energy but potentialy highly relevant for future bioenergy supply (Table 1, (de 
Wit and Faaij 2010)). Within Europe, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, the Baltic States 
and Poland might have the highest potential at low costs (de Wit and Faaij 2010). 
Costs of biomass vary between European countries, with feedstock, climatic and 
geographic conditions, and the state of supply chain logistics: 5–15 €/GJ for current 
food-based biofuels with possibly lower costs for residues and dedicated bioenergy 
crops (de Wit and Faaij 2010). Under ideal circumstances, electricity from biomass 
is cost competitive with electricity from fossil sources, but prices remained above 
20€c/kWh in 2012 (European Commission 2012d). Its most significant role is as a 
flexible fuel counterbalancing intermitency from other renewables. In many cases 
biomass stil builds on mandates or monetary incentive to be supplied in energy 
systems. As land availability is a limiting factor, higher demand results in higher 
prices on feedstock, while supply chain logistics experience notable learning curves, 
i.e. reduce prices. 
The global warming impact of bioenergy remains uncertain with inductive
studies pointing to relevant life-cycle emissions in the short run, whereas global 
integrated assessment models indicate the potential for bioenergy for climate change 
mitigation (F. Creutzig et al. 2012). Life-cycle emissions and climate change 
mitigation effects are highly variable, and depend on fertilizer application, land use 
change effects, yields, and market-mediated effects. Guaranteeing food security and 
the protection of biodiversity can constitute additional constraints on bioenergy 
deployment. 
The technical potential of solar energy based electricity generation appears to be 
no practical limitation to a European energy transition. In the EU, on average a 
photovoltaic module area being equivalent to 0.6 of a country’s surface area is 
sufficient to deliver the country’s complete electricity consumption (Šúri et al. 
2007). This potential shrinks if only rooftop instalations and instalations near or on 
sealed land are considered as indicated in Table 1. The dominating technology to 
harvest this huge potential wil be photovoltaics. The costs of electricity from solar 
photovoltaics vary strongly depending on the used technology, system size and 
country of deployment. As a global trend, however, electricity from photovoltaics 
has become continuously cheaper over the last decades. The costs can be split into 
two major cost components: the costs for PV modules on the one hand, and on the 
other hand the additional costs to plan, market, and construct a complete system 
comprising photovoltaic modules, inverters and other components al summarized as 
balance of system costs (BOS). PV modules are traded on a more or less global 
market. Since 1979, global average module prices decreased with a learning rate of 
22 (22 price reduction for each doubling of cumulative volume) for the dominating 
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crystaline silicon technology (IRENA 2013), with current (September 2013) 
average prices on the European spot market between 0.58 €/Wp - 0.74 €/Wp10, even 
below that historic trend. In contrast learning rates for BOS differ by country being 
about 15 in Germany and 7 in the United States (Seel, Barbose, and Wiser 2012), 
reflecting among other reasons different administrative conditions for the 
deployment of photovoltaic systems. Together with different market maturity 
(cumulative instaled photovoltaic capacity), this results in a wide range of BOS 
with the global average of 1.19 €/Wp being nearly double as high as best cases in 
the range of 0.6 €/Wp, which are realized with utility scale ground mounted systems 
in Germany (IRENA 2013). The resulting levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) in 
turn depend on the cost for capital reflected in the calculatory interest rate and the 
specific yield, which is the amount of generated electricity for one year divided by 
the system’s capacity. This results into a situation in which LCOE in mature markets 
like Germany can be comparable to LCOE in southern Europe, where higher 
specific yields (more sun) are ofset by higher BOS and higher capital costs (Kost et 
al. 2013). 
2.2 Economic potential estimates 
It is clear that the ful technical potential of any renewable energy source can hardly 
be used under realistic circumstances, that is, when economic and sustainability 
constraints are accounted for. Economic potential estimates are usualy pursued by 
means of large-scale models of the European energy system and macro economy. In 
the 28th round of the model intercomparison exercise Energy Modeling Forum 
(EMF28), thirteen different models have been employed to calculate scenarios that 
lead to an 80 greenhouse gas emission reduction in 2050 relative to 1990. A robust 
conclusion across al models is that the variable renewable energy sources wind and 
solar wil both have a substantialy larger role to play, with a median share of 27 in 
the European electricity sector for the year 2050 (Knopf, Bakken, et al. 2013). This 
share even increases up to 37 if CCS is not available and up to about 50 if in 
addition no new nuclear power plants are being built.  A more detailed analysis of 
individual countries technology mixes in the electricity sector reveals that they differ 
significantly across countries and largely depend on the type of renewable potential 
that each country is endowed with (Knopf, Chen, et al. 2013). However, a common 
denominator of the energy system models employed in the EMF28 model 
comparison exercise is that they do not explicitly consider infrastructure 
requirements (Knopf, Chen, et al. 2013; Knopf, Bakken, et al. 2013). The EMF28 
scenarios have also been analyzed with dedicated infrastructure models (Holz and 
von Hirschhausen 2013). In this context Egerer et al. (Egerer, Gerbaulet, and Lorenz 
2013) find with a line-sharp model of the European transmission grid that more that 
around 50,000km of pan-European transmission lines need to be built or upgraded 
for achieving a cost-efficient system. 
10 Wp (Wat Peak) is commonly used in the PV field to describe the size of PV
systems. A module with 1Wp would deliver 1 W power output under standard test
conditions. 
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A particularly important driver for transmission infrastructure expansion is the 
location of renewable electricity generation capacities. Schmid and Knopf (Schmid 
and Knopf 2013) show that diferent assumptions on the development of specific 
investment costs for wind and solar technologies lead to substantialy diferent 
configurations of a cost-optimal decarbonized European electricity system in the 
long-term future. Figure 2 ilustrates average annual power flows in 2050 in two 
scenarios that alow for a high expansion of transmission capacities between 
ENTSO-E regions but with differing assumptions for the investment costs of wind 
and solar technologies: once with values set to the middle of the range reported in 
literature, and once with optimistic cost development assumptions for solar 
technologies (which appears to be plausible given the discussion in 2.1), and 
pessimistic ones for wind technologies. In the first case it is particularly the wind 
resources in the north-western, northern and eastern European periphery that 
generate a surplus of electricity that is imported to central Europe. In the second 
case the patern changes significantly – here it is particularly the solar resources of
the Iberian Peninsula and South-Eastern Europe that are exploited and transported to 
central Europe.  
Figure 2. Average annual net electricity flows between ENTSO-E regions in the 
year 2050 for two scenarios with high transmission capacity expansion between 
regions and different assumptions on the development of investment costs for wind 
and solar technologies, i.e. middle of the range in the literature (left) and solar 
optimistic /wind pessimistic values from the range in the literature (right). Source: 
Figure 5 in Schmid and Knopf  (Schmid and Knopf 2013). 
Schmid and Knopf (Schmid and Knopf 2013) find for a set of scenarios that the 
increasing integration of the European electricity system by means of transmission 
capacity expansion leads to a reduction of total system costs of 2-3.5 over the period 
2010-2050, confirming earlier results that grid integration is a no-regret option for 
Europe as a whole. This finding is robust across scenarios that are based on diferent 
assumptions on the development of investment costs for wind and solar 
technologies. The basic logic is that, once pan-European transmission capacities are 
expanded, the cost-optimal location of wind and solar capacities shifts to 
comparatively more favorable resources in the European periphery. Whether the 
“Northern solution” based on wind energy or the “Southern solution” based on solar 
energy is more cost-optimal wil depend on the comparative development of their 
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investment costs. The implications of different pathways for individual countries 
would be substantial. This includes issues such as 1) dependence on other countries 
(e.g., in the transmission expansion scenario some countries turn into net importers); 
2)change in domestic technology mixes; and 3) modified capital requirements of
individual countries for renewable investments. From a global perspective, however, 
the costs are not overly sensitive with respect to the design of the European 
electricity system in terms of transmission corridors and the choice of which 
renewables potential to tap into. Considering that the ilustrated pathways are 
designed to be primarily optimal with respect to the policy objective of climate 
change mitigation, it seems therefore worthwhile to explore further what the 
externalities of increasing RE deployment are with respect to other public policy 
objectives related to sustainability. Such an analysis would alow exploiting the 
broad optimum to simultaneously achieve such other objectives. 
However, quantitative energy system models are bound to simplify the energy 
system in order to remain numericaly tractable and are only able to consider effects 
that are quantifiable after al, and thus do not consider most of these externalities. 
Furthermore, estimates of the economic potential of RE are strongly dependent on 
underlying assumptions. While there is a multitude of issues, the folowing 
discussion concentrates on specific quantifiable and non-quantifiable efects that are 
of particular interest for a European energy transition. 
The most important aspect that is either neglected or represented in very 
simplified terms is the variability of wind and solar both on the temporal and 
geographical scale (Edenhofer, Hirth, et al. 2013). Time scales are mostly coarsely 
specified. Many energy system models possess limited means to deal with 
fluctuations. Instead these fluctuations are usualy represented by characteristic days 
or comparable concepts (e.g. a fixed share of flexible gas power plants per RE 
capacity). The geographical resolution is usualy confined to model regions in the 
size of countries that exhibit significant intra-regional variability, with beneficial or 
detrimental correlations in terms of balancing requirements. Other options to 
balance production and demand than grid interconnections are usualy neglected 
(e.g. special configuration of solar modules, virtual power plants of decentralized 
dispersed combined heat and power plants and especialy demand side 
management). The major reason for their omission is most likely the crude 
geographical scale and the lack of explicit consideration of individual actors. New 
electricity planning models, however, alow fine-grained considerations of both 
temporal intermitency and spatial variation (Fripp 2012; Mileva et al. 2013), 
pointing tentatively to higher renewable-share potentials, though these models have 
not been validated for Europe. 
A range of issues that are not directly quantifiable may remain beyond modeling 
exercises. The non-quantifiability arises on the one hand due to a lack of theoretical 
concepts to describe the effects in stylized models, and on the other hand due to 
non-observability of the data. Three issues seem particularly important: a) the wider 
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macro-economic impact of RE deployment, b) employment effects and c) energy 
security. Due to their focus on the energy system, such models represent 
macroeconomic processes only very crudely, if at al. But the renewables industry 
does not act in isolation; especialy on a regional or local level the public policy 
objective of climate change mitigation often has lower priority than employment, 
energy security or direct environmental efects. 
3.Evaluating welfare increase induced by co-efects of
an European energy transition
If an energy transition focuses RE deployment in the periphery, particularly in 
southern European countries, the benefit and cost distribution could be such that the 
economic debt crises could be efectively mediated. In the folowing, we analyze 
this argument in more detail. 
3.1 Stimulus effect of RE deployment in the periphery
Besides positive environmental effects related to reductions in GHG emissions, 
increased spending on RE infrastructure could potentialy have the effect of an 
economic stimulus. The idea that economic slumps can to at least some extent be 
remedied by fiscal policies is a cornerstone of Keynesian macro-economics and has 
regained prominence in the recent financial and economic crisis, in which the 
world’s major economies have enacted stimulus packages to revive their economies. 
The basic premise of this theory is that an economic downturn is first and foremost a 
consequence of a shortfal in demand, and that it can be tackled by reviving demand 
through either lowering taxes or increasing public spending. It has been suggested 
that it would be advantageous to target activities that not only have a stimulus effect, 
but also yield environmental benefits (Edenhofer et al. 2009; Goulder 1995; 
Manresa and Sancho 2005).  Related literature suggests that a deep recession, 
characterized by a debt crisis, triggers saving eforts in the private sector 
(Demetriades and Mamuneas 2000; Koo 2011; Lin and Doemeland 2012). An 
expansion of the public sector can then prevent the long continuation of the 
recession. Understanding infrastructures as the template and basis for economic 
activities, targeted public investments in infrastructure construction and maintenance 
can be most productive (Demetriades and Mamuneas 2000; Lin and Doemeland 
2012; Munnel 1992). 
The respective literature identifies several criteria for stimulus spending to have 
a positive effect on growth. First, they exhibit their most pronounced positive effect 
when the economy is in a slump, while they are less efective in a growing economy 
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012; Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber 2012; 
Blanchard and Leigh 2013). Second, the associated fiscal multipliers – i.e. the 
expansion of output as a reaction to an increase in demand (either through tax cuts 
or additional government spending) – are largest if interest rates are (very) low 
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011) and in the presence of a financial crisis 
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(Corseti, Meier, and Müler 2012). Third, stimulus measures are found to be more
efective if they rely on additional spending instead of tax cuts (Baunsgaard et al. 
2012). More pronounced positive effects of stimulus measures should be expected if 
the additional spending keeps government debt within certain boundaries. 
Otherwise, high debts might undermine investment incentives due to expectations of 
a deteriorating business environment (Alesina and Ardagna 2010; Nickel and 
Tudyka 2013). 
Arguably, al the above conditions hold for the case of increased investment in 
RE in the EU periphery. The corresponding countries are by 2013 stil experiencing 
economic recessions. Interest rates remain low, while the banking system is severely 
weakened. The discussed infrastructure investments would hence boost public 
spending, and – if their costs were covered by countries from the core (for financing 
see section 4.2.2) – would not increase government debt. Reviewing a total of 37 
empirical studies, Baunsgaard et al. (Baunsgaard et al. 2012) find that under such 
conditions, observed fiscal multipliers range between 0 and 2.1, with a mean of 0.8. 
Of course, the described effects are not uniform across countries, and detailed 
country-specific studies would be required in order to understand the conditions that 
have to put into place to achieve the most in terms of stimulus (Baum, Poplawski-
Ribeiro, and Weber 2012). 
In terms of volume, RE investment could be of an order of magnitude that
yields noticeable effects on economic activity. For instance, spending on FiTs for 
RE in Germany in 2012 amounted to about 0.6 of GDP11. This figure is comparable 
to the 0.5 of GDP targeted at infrastructure investment in order to kick-start growth 
in the EU proposed in a recent proposal by Grifith-Jones et al. (Griffith-Jones et al. 
2012) whereas the stimulus packages enacted in the EU during the period 2008-
2010 amount to about 2 of GDP (Spencer, Lucas, and Emmanuel 2012). 
Perhaps the most substantial concern regarding the stimulus effects of increased 
spending on RE concerns the timeframe in which they can be carried out: as few RE 
projects are ‘shovel ready’, they might require several years of planning and 
investment. Hence, policies aiming to achieve short-run should focus on projects 
that can be put into practice relatively quickly (solar PV, for example, can be built 
relatively fast). However, also projects with a longer ramp-up phase could help to 
overcome the recession, as the later is not merely a short-term fluctuation of the 
business cycle, but rather a structural crisis that can be expected to last for several 
years. Hence, increased spending on RE could contribute towards improving long-
term growth prospects in the periphery. 
11 As part of the Energy Roadmap 2050, the EU Commission has assessed that a shift 
from reference scenarios with existing policy measures to low-carbon scenarios would 
require €260 bilion in annual average incremental investments over 2010 – 2050, which 
is equivalent to 2.1% of 2008 EU GDP (however, it should be noted that the largest part
of these investments are projected for energy eficiency measures). 
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3.2 Employment effects
Evaluating the labour market efects of renewable energy policies in detail is a 
chalenging task that requires an assessment of how value chains and production 
paterns adjust in the mid-term and how structural adjustment and innovative 
activity respond in the long term. Results depend on (a) the assessment of positive 
employment efects (consideration of the electricity sector only or the renewable 
energy sector in general including also heat systems and biofuels; assumptions about 
foreign trade effects), (b) the assessment of negative employment effects (crowding-
out effects only or budget efects as wel), and (c) the time horizon of the 
assessments in general. A comprehensive assessment of these efects is missing so 
far and numbers from different studies are often not comparable with each other as 
they consider diferent aspects. Nonetheless, we summarize here some studies that 
refer to the employment efect of RE. 
One study finds that under the  ‘Energy(R)evolution’ scenario developed by 
Greenpeace, which sets a target of reducing global GHG emissions by 50 below 
their 1990 level by 2050, 500’000 additional workers wil be employed in the 
energy sector of the EU27 compared to the business-as-usual case (Rutovitz and 
Atherton 2009). A very similar figure is obtained by Ragwitz et al. (Ragwitz et al. 
2009), who assume a 20 share of renewable energy in the EU’s final energy as 
stated in the Renewable Energy Directive for 2020. Under this scenario, Greece is 
projected to have an employment gain of roughly 1 and Spain of 0.6, while Ireland 
only sees a negligibly smal but stil positive impact on employment. Most 
additional jobs are created in industrial manufacturing sectors. These numbers also 
agree wel with the order of magnitude found in analysis of current employment on 
national levels and globaly (Aretz et al. 2013; Räuber, Warmuth, and Farian 2013; 
Sawin et al. 2013). For example, a typical number of 11 thousand employees per 
instaled GW of PV electricity is found in Germany in several studies in a very 
rough analysis, simply dividing the number of ful-time equivalent jobs associated 
with the complete German PV sector by the number of GW instaled in the same 
year (2012) (Aretz et al. 2013; Räuber, Warmuth, and Farian 2013; Sawin et al. 
2013). On a global scale the same indicator is even four times higher (Sawin et al. 
2013). 
As policies that increase the share of renewables may lead to rising electricity 
prices, job gains in the energy sector have to be weighed against potential job losses 
in other sectors. For instance, while energy-intensive industries are mostly 
exempted, and actualy benefit from lower electricity prices, household electricity 
prices in Germany had already risen by 5 in 2009, which can be partly atributed to 
the Renewable Energy Law (“Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources. What 
Does It Cost Us?” 2009) and have since increased markedly for several reasons, 
including the increasing share of renewable energies and increasing numbers of 
exemptions from the support payments for industries. Ragwitz et al. (Ragwitz et al. 
2009) estimate that reaching the EU’s 2020 goals might entail electricity price 
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increases of on average 2.2, concluding that these increases should not have 
substantial negative effects on the EU’s industrial structure. These costs could 
further be lowered if EU member states harmonized their support of renewables in 
order to exploit potentials cost effectively (the total annual costs of renewable 
energy deployment could be lowered by about €10 bilion if member states traded 
energy as a good in a single European market instead of national markets (European 
Commission 2011)). 
These considerations notwithstanding, the empirical evidence on net
employment efects is mixed. Some confirm a significant increase in employment 
(Lehr et al. 2008; Wei, Patadia, and Kammen 2010),  while others find zero or 
negative effects (EWI, IE, and RWI 2004; Hilebrand et al. 2006). Crucialy, 
equilibrium efects on employment depend on the revenue source and/or the 
counterfactual spending (see also section 4.2). For example, if financed by labour 
taxes, economic models suggest that RE subsidies decrease employment and welfare 
(Böhringer, Keler, and van der Werf 2013). Overal, a comprehensive assessment of 
the net efects of RE deployment is lacking; arguments for RE policies based on 
employment effects are subjects to considerable uncertainty and ignorance. Hence, 
RE policies as such should not be regarded as an appropriate means to remedy 
underlying distortions in the labour market. Yet, if conducted as part of a stimulus 
measure, it makes good economic sense to consider employment effects of such 
policies, as the unemployment can be atributed to a shortfal in demand rather than 
labour market frictions. In such a situation, measures to boost employment can 
improve an economy’s long-term growth potential, as they e.g. reduce the 
depreciation of human capital occurring under long-term unemployment (which 
could lead to ‘hysteresis’, i.e. the economy not returning to its previous potential 
output after a crisis) (Blanchard and Summers 1989). 
3.3 Energy security
Covering a higher share of domestic energy consumption can also have bearing on a
country’s energy security. In its broadest sense, energy security refers to the 
uninterrupted provision of vital energy services (Johansson et al. 2012), or from a 
system perspective to robustness against sudden disruptions of energy supply 
(Arvizu et al. 2011). Building on these concepts, three particular dimensions of 
energy security have been identified: A) depletion of exhaustible resources; B) 
import dependence; and C) variability and reliability of energy supply at affordable 
costs (IPCC 2011). In turn, these dimensions are influenced by a number of factors, 
in particular the portfolio of power plants (fuels, capacity), transmission lines, 
storage and demand. 
We discuss each of three dimensions of energy security in turn. Any policy to 
increase the share of RE wil reduce the depletion rate of exhaustible resources, 
especialy in the presence of a carbon tax or a tightened ETS. In other words, RE 
deployment in peripheral countries wil contribute to prolonging the life-time of 
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existing deposits of exhaustible resources and dampen the rise of extraction costs by 
avoiding the need to tap low-grade, high cost reserves of coal and gas. 
Addressing the import dependence, some periphery countries are net importers 
of about 2-15 of their electricity consumption (especialy Italy, and to lesser degree 
Greece and Ireland see Table 1). RES support may help to increase the share of 
domestic generation in these countries - and even convert them into net exporters of 
electricity. This would support lowering current account deficits, which for Greece 
and Portugal amounted to more than 6 in 2012 (European Commission 2012c). In 
addition, an increase in RES generation typicaly crowds out natural gas and oil-
fired power plants, the fuels for which are often imported from outside the EU 
[79,80]. 
Third, due to their fluctuating time profiles, higher reliance on RE could 
negatively affect grid stability, especialy if large shares of total electricity are met 
by RE. This is a very relevant risk and applicable for RE deployment without a 
comprehensive system transition. Complementary and necessary system measures 
would include investments in storage and back-up capacities, which, however, 
would involve additional costs during the transition. In fact, a detailed study 
demonstrated that energy security is possible with 100 RE if wel integrated with 
storage units and energy-savings measures even on the national level (Henning and 
Palzer 2014; Palzer and Henning 2014). Moreover, this transition, once completed, 
would deliver electricity at similar costs as the existing energy supply [81]. On the 
other hand, closer integration of the European electricity grid would not only lower 
costs by means of reaping gains from trade, but would also increase reliability of 
electricity supply, as – at least on average – regional fluctuations would cancel out 
on a larger scale. Increasing transmission capacity is particularly important for the 
peripheral countries investigated (especialy for Poland, Ireland and Spain, and to 
lesser degree for Greece, Italy), which display the lowest ration of interconnection 
capacity over peak load (Fig. 4 in E3G (E3G 2013)). 
For the EU, the perceived dependence on Russian gas might increase the
desirability of RE if integrated with the heating sector. But generaly, while RE can 
contribute to energy security, depending on the overal system design, the 
comparative advantage of RE lies in its environmental benefits rather than in its 
potential to increase energy security (Borenstein 2011). 
4.How to promote an energy transition in the European
periphery? 
4.1 Barriers to renewable deployment 
In principle, support schemes have been implemented in virtualy al countries in the 
periphery to address barriers to RE deployment. The EU also provided an option for 
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bilateral agreements between Member States spur RE deployment (see Section 4.2). 
These eforts notwithstanding, significant barriers remain. 
The cooperative mechanisms established by the EU have hardly been made use 
of - either because Member States are unlikely to be sanctioned if their RE targets 
are not met, or because their targets are not very ambitious and can be easily 
atained by domestic measures (Bataglini et al. 2012; European Commission 2007). 
More importantly, important barriers stil prevail at the Member State level. To 
evaluate barriers to RE deployment, we report and categorize these barriers in 
selected recession countries (Table 2). We find that economic and administrative 
barriers are the dominant obstacles for RE deployment. In the economic domain, the 
financial crisis exacerbated financing chalenges as governments reduced support 
policies. For instance, in Spain and Italy, the crisis intensified the slowing down of 
the RES development. In Spain, poorly designed policies based on subsidizing 
programs through high feed-in tariffs have increased the difference between utility 
payments to renewable power producers and revenues utilities colect from 
customers annualy (Gobierno de España 2013; Rathmann et al. 2011).  In 
consequence, the national government restricted incentives. In 2013, Spain and Italy 
eliminated subsides to renewable production (Autorita´ per l´energia eletrica e il gas 
2013; Gobierno de España 2013). Legal uncertainty has also influenced ratings 
agency to downgrade tariff deficit securitizations. Consequently, the current lack of 
predictability has been translated to market instability. Often the high initial capital 
investments are discouraging for investors. In addition, in some countries (e.g., 
Poland and Spain) taxation regimes further disincentive investments into renewables 
(Ecorys 2010). 
Administrative obstacles constitute the second important category of barriers 
(Table 2). Many projects suffer delays due to lack of harmonization in legal 
frameworks, trading schemes and administrative procedures; regulatory and 
administrative issues impair the RE development. In many countries of the 
European periphery the lack in the national regulatory framework provokes an 
asynchrony in receiving authorizations. The high number of administrative bodies 
involved in the approval procedures for the instalation also lengthens the process 
(Assosolare 2011; Ecorys 2010; Rathmann et al. 2011). By the same token, the 
complexity and lack of standardization of environmental procedures also limits RE 
projects (e.g., Italy and Poland). Such administrative hurdles contribute to deterring 
investors (Ecorys 2010). The spread of PV deployment costs between Germany and 
some Southern Europe countries, such as Greece, is most likely due to the diference 
in bureaucratic costs and other soft costs.  
Important barriers are also related to infrastructural limits. In some cases, lack 
of transmission capacity hinders instalation of RE (e.g., Italy, Ireland and Greece). 
In other cases, the transmission lines need to be extended or modernized. In 
addition, political and social conflicts (e.g.; the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) 
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syndrome) prevent the development of RE. Finaly, policies for RE deployment
often compete rather than co-operate with environmental protection and land use 
and face community acceptance (Ecorys 2010; Rathmann et al. 2011). 
Table 2. Country-specific barriers for the RE development in European periphery. 
Ful circle: the issue is crucial for the country. Empty circle: the issue is relevant for 





























































Regional inhomogeneity in the procedures, especialy in 
environmental ones, high capital costs related to landscape 
policies and administration fees (8-12% of the total costs) and 
high number of administrative bodies involved  that provoke 
long authorization processes and asynchrony in receiving 
authorizations  discourage investors (Assosolare 2011; Ecorys 
2010). 
Environmental groups and Regions oppose to the instalation of 
onshore wind turbines to not alter the natural landscape. For 
ofshore wind turbines, constraints come from the depth of the 
coastal water (World Energy Council 2007). 




Often large initial capital requirements prevent the development 
of RES. The instalation of photovoltaic panels is limited to 
special purposes and in most cases these are not connected to 
the grid (Ecorys 2010; Minister of Economy 2011). For RES in 
buildings, low financial support available for individuals and 
lack of information lead to low RES instalation. Historical and 
public buildings do not often include RES technology, showing 
a lack of exemplary action (Ecorys 2010). 
Transmission lines are often obsolete and insuficient. The 
Energy Law is not clear about the sharing between investors and 
TSO for their modernization. Operators are not obliged by any 
legal regulations and nor stimulated by any financial incentive 
to invest in the modernization and expansion of the grid. 
Landowners are not wiling to permit the lines to be built up on 
their properties (Ecorys 2010). 
The procedural, administrative and regulatory frameworks are 
fragmented, since the RES sector is regulated by numerous
executive supplements to the Energy Law. This provokes
asynchrony in receiving authorizations, lengthens processes and 
discourages investors, e.g. when hydropower, biomass and 
smal power plants are evaluated. The procedures for smal 
power plants are as complex as those for large plants. 
Environmental  procedures are complicated and  non-
standardized. RES compete with environmental protection and 
land use policies. Resistance of local authorities to RES results 
in a lack of regional planning and public support (Ecorys 2010). 






Legal framework shift from subsidising to restrictive 
oriented leads to market instability (Gobierno de España 
2013). Infrastructure development – mainly distribution 
network and grid connexion – is afected by regional 
inhomogeneity and ineficiency in administrative 
procedures, and the large number of administrative bodies
involved. This lengthens the authorization process and 
subsequently discourages investors (Ecorys 2010; Rathmann 
et al. 2011). 




Feed-in tarifs have an upper capacity limit, which is far 
exceeded by the number of applications for grid connections. 
The number of subsidized filed projects is uncertain (Ecorys
2010; Rathmann et al. 2011). 
Important infrastructural  bariers,  mainly concerning 
transportation  grids, limit the  RES  development. 
Additionaly, Ireland and the European Continent are not 
directly connected (Ecorys 2010). 




Grid congestion problems exist in locations with high RES 
potential. Greek islands are excluded from any RES project 
because they are not connected to the main grid due to 
capital constraints and the great depth of the Aegean Sea. 
Complicated administrative  procedures and  multiple 
authorities involved – interpreting law in diferent ways – 
cause authorization  delays.  A  national lack  of 
communication and awareness provokes local opposition 
(Ecorys 2010). 
Lack of experience (procedural expertise) in obtaining 
financial support from the EU community is perceived as a 
barier to RES development (personal communication 
Argyropoulos, D., 2013).  
● ● ● ○  
4.2 A Multi-Level implementation strategy with a stronger role 
for the EU 
A European energy transition would profit, if Member States in the periphery 
implemented national measures to address the barriers outlined above more 
properly. Exemplarily for the large body of literature, Lehmann et al. (Lehmann et 
al. 2012) provide an overview of instruments, which could be employed to spur an 
energy transition. Policies can address three categories: RE generation, grid, and 
storage and demand response. A coordination of these diferent categories is crucial 
as energy investments are strongly path-dependent, sub-optimal investment 
decisions taken today are perpetuated over a long period of time (Kalkuhl, 
Edenhofer, and Lessmann 2012; Lehmann and Gawel 2013; Unruh 2000). Country-
specific options are briefly summarized in the right column of Table 3. 
In the light of the Eurozone crisis and the associated budgetary limits – but also 
due to institutional constraints – it is highly unlikely that most Member States in the 
periphery wil be able to overcome the barriers in the short term by themselves. As a 
consequence, a strong(er) enabling policy framework at the EU level could support 
an energy transition. For example, a uniform European feed-in tariff including an 
EU-wide compensation scheme could be proposed. However, such schemes would 
need to be adapted to and coordinated with local and national circumstances and 
policies. Wel-intentioned top-down schemes are bound to fail if opposing local civil 
society is ignored (Scot 1998) (Felix Creutzig and Goldschmidt 2008); an 
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exclusively top-down European approach for energy policy is neither economicaly 
justifiable nor legaly and politicaly feasible. 
The analysis in 4.1 suggests that ‘soft’ bureaucratic costs of RE deployment 
may explain the relatively high costs in some Southern European countries. 
Providing funds for overcoming this cost barrier (e.g., human capacity building; 
designing streamlined bureaucratic procedures) could make RE deployment more 
cost competitive and bring LCOEs down to those in front-runner countries. 
From an economic perspective, the folowing arguments can be put forward in 
favor of a certain degree of decentralization in energy policy. First, the theory of 
fiscal federalism (e.g., Oates; Shobe and Burtraw (Oates 1999; Oates 1972; Shobe 
and Burtraw 2012)) suggests that co-benefits (and co-costs) of RE deployment that 
are realized at the local or regional scale are more likely to be addressed properly by 
policy approaches taken at the same scale, such as regionaly differentiated RE 
schemes (Siler-Evans et al. 2013). Second, technology preferences and geographical 
conditions – and accordingly the assessment of related costs and benefits of diferent 
options – may vary across regions, and may explain the heterogeneity of technology 
choices observed across Europe (Knopf, Bakken, et al. 2013; Knopf, Chen, et al. 
2013). Third, if the actual performance of policy approaches is subject to 
uncertainty, regulatory diversity and competition may promote institutional and 
policy innovation and difusion (Ania and Wagener 2012; Oates 1999; Shobe and 
Burtraw 2012), and even lead to botom-up policy convergence over time as 
observed in the EU (Jacobs 2012; Kitzing, Mitchel, and Morthorst 2012).  
From a legal perspective, it has to be pointed out that the current European legal 
framework impairs a ful harmonization of energy policies across Member States 
(see, e.g., Calies and Hey (Calies and Hey 2013)). On the one hand, Article 194 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) mentions energy 
policy as a field of European responsibility, folowing inter alia the principles of 
environmental conservation and solidarity across Member States. On the other hand, 
however, the same Article also clearly emphasizes that the competences regarding 
the exploitation of energy sources and the choice and use of energy technologies 
reside with Member States. It wil need strong political wil to strengthen EU 
competencies in the short- or mid-term as Member States usualy have a strong 
interest in maintaining their energy policy sovereignty to protect their national 
energy technology mixes and energy security at the national level. 
Consequently, a pragmatic strategy to promote RE deployment and generate
related benefits particularly in the periphery has to rest jointly on European as wel 
as Member State activities. Against this background, we see two particular avenues 
for the EU to promote an energy transition in the periphery: Strengthening the 
regulatory framework for Member State policies and providing funds. These 
avenues are briefly outlined in the folowing and also summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Policy instruments at EU and Member State level to address barriers to RE 
generation, grid extension and storage and demand response. 
EU policies 









Seting a separate RE
target for 2030 
Promoting the use of 
cooperation mechanisms 
for renewable energy 
policy 
Employing the open 
method of coordination for 
RE policies 
Strengthening the EU 
Emissions Trading 
Scheme by seting 
ambitious GHG reduction 
targets for 2030 
Increasing minimum tax 
rates for non-renewable 
fuels 




skils and arangement of 
financing schemes 
Alocating a higher 
share of EU ETS 
auctioning revenues to 
Member States in the 
periphery 
Targeting loans of the 
European Investment 
Bank (EIB) more 
strongly to renewable 
energy investments 
Targeting loans under 
the European 
Investment Fund (EIF) 
more strongly to smal 
and medium-size 
enterprises in the field 




(ERDF) and the 
Cohesion Fund more 




Providing and modifying 
support policies for RE
deployment, e.g. low interest 
rates for investments, and 
generation subsidies 
Phasing-out adverse 
subsidies/increasing taxes for 
fossil and nuclear fuels 
Implementing transparent and 
participatory planning 
processes, e.g., including zoning 
of priority areas 
Standardizing binding 
permiting procedures for 
renewable energy investments
with one-stop contact points for 
investors 
Waiving administrative fees
for permiting renewable energy 
investments 
Compensation schemes for 









States’ diverse technical 
standards 
Strengthening the 
competencies of the 
Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) 
More transparent
planning process for grid 
development  
Providing financial 
support via the 
Cohesion Fund 
Shalow connection charges
plus diferentiated network use 
of system charges to provide 
locational signals 
Stronger regulatory incentives














standards for smart meters 
Dynamic electricity pricing 
for customers 
Time-variant grid fees and
taxes 
Lower entrance bariers to 
anciliary markets, e.g., smaler 
bid size in balancing markets 
Large-scale support for 
infrastructure development 
(smart meters and grids) 
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4.2.1 Strengthening the regulatory framework for an European Energy
Transition 
Measures to strengthen the regulatory framework refer, in the first place, to the 
limited array of energy policy means – as specified in the Renewables Directive 
2009/28/EC (European Parliament 2009). First of al, a separate target for RE (next 
to a greenhouse gas reduction target) for 2030 would address the additional market 
failures that are associated with the deployment of RE. This should again be 
translated into National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs), which provide 
a clear guideline for Member State policies. In addition, the cooperation 
mechanisms established by the Directive – statistical transfers, joint projects and 
joint support schemes – would spur EU-wide RE deployment. So far, these 
mechanisms have only rarely been used for a variety of reasons (Bataglini et al. 
2012; European Commission 2013; Klessmann et al. 2010; Klinge Jacobsen et al. 
2014). Notable exceptions include the North Sea electricity grid founded in 2010 by 
nine EU States and Norway and the colaborative plans between Germany, Poland, 
the Czech Republic and the Netherlands to commonly manage fluctuating wind 
power (EEX Transparency Platform 2013). Finaly, the European Commission can 
make active use of the open method of coordination to promote voluntary 
convergence of Member State policies (Ania and Wagener 2012; Borrás and 
Jacobsson 2004; Kerber and Eckardt 2007). This method supports the exchange on 
experiences with and the performance of RE schemes across the EU – and may 
thereby stimulate regulatory competition and learning. 
Beyond energy policy, the EU may also strengthen the regulatory framework in 
other policy fields for which it holds stronger competencies and which may have 
direct and indirect impacts on RE investment decisions (see, e.g., Calies and Hey 
(Calies and Hey 2013)). First of al, this applies to the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS, in line with Article 192 TFEU (European Parliament 2008)), 
which, if tightened, could provide stronger incentives to switch to RE technologies. 
Second, minimum tax rates for fossil fuels and energy (European Parliament 2003) 
could be increased to promote fuel switching. Third, the integration of the internal 
energy market (in line with Article 114 TFEU (European Parliament 2008)) may be 
further promoted. Fourth, the EU could adopt more effective measures to support 
trans-European electricity grids (Article 172 TFEU (European Parliament 2008)). In 
fact, Article 170 TFEU (European Parliament 2008) emphasizes that such measures 
should pay particular consideration to connecting peripheral regions. Eligible 
measures include common guidelines to ensure network interoperability, a 
harmonization of Member States’ diverse technical standards as wel as the 
provision of financial support via the Cohesion Fund (Article 171 TFEU (European 
Parliament 2008)). In this context, a strengthening of the competencies of the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) as wel as a stronger 
engagement of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity (ENTSO-E) may be desirable, particularly to alow for a more target-
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oriented planning of trans-European networks. A more transparent planning process 
could promote public acceptance of grid development. 
4.2.2 Financing an European Energy transition 
Financing a European energy transition cannot be treated as an independent
chalenge to that of the political design of the energy transition. The counterfactual 
efects of not raising revenues can be substantial. In fact, Böhringer et al. 
(Böhringer, Keler, and van der Werf 2013) demonstrated that the overal 
employment and welfare effects are negative when an energy transition is financed 
by taxes on labor (or, to lesser degree, on electricity). This needs to be seen against a 
background of economic analysis that suggests that a shift from labor taxation to 
natural resource taxation could produce a double dividend by decreasing distortions 
in the labor market and making workers and employees beter of, while at the same 
time incentivizing more efficient resource use (Bovenberg 1999; Goulder 2013). 
This result co-aligns with more theoretical results pointing to the potential of rent 
taxation (e.g. land rent) to finance public goods without reducing market efficiency 
(Matauch et al. 2013). Specificaly, taxing GHG emissions could generate a climate 
rent that outperforms the counterfactual fossil fuel rent, generating a trilion $ 
revenue stream globaly (Bauer et al. 2013). Hence, a primary source of funding of a 
European energy transition could come from within the climate change mitigation 
system, from taxing or pricing CO2. 
Within the European Union, the framework for generating a climate rent has 
been already established. Revenues are generated by auctioning ETS alowances. 
Resulting revenues are already used to redistribute funds to those Member States, 
which are least wealthy (10 of total revenues) or have realized most GHG emissions 
reductions (2 of total revenues). Both characteristics apply to many Member States 
in the south and east, and could be further extended to promote RE deployment in 
the periphery. For comparison, a hypothetical price increase of 20€/tCO2 for 
emissions in the European energy industries would bring an additional revenue of 
about 30 bilion € per year at 2012 levels of consumption. A fraction of about 1-3 
billion € annualy could help to reduce the barriers (soft costs in RE deployment; see 
4.1 and 4.2.1) and incentivize renewable deployment of a higher order of magnitude. 
Other modes of financing could also be considered. Several European programs 
of financial assistance are already targeted to less wealthy regions in the periphery 
and/or the development of environmentaly friendly energy technologies – including 
loans of the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund and 
means of the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund. 
Specificaly, the proposed expansion of loans from the European Investment Bank 
to leverage investments in recession countries (Griffith-Jones et al. 2012) could be 
specificaly directed towards RE deployment and similar investments to decrease 
energy dependence and mitigate climate change. 
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5.Conclusion
Our analysis substantiates Leggewie’s claim (Leggewie 2012) that an energy 
transition towards renewables in the Mediterranean region constitutes an important 
element towards a successful continuation of the European peace project and 
integration. Starting with climate change mitigation as a key objective, this paper 
argues that a European energy transition towards renewable energies is not only 
possible from a renewable resources point of view (Section 2), but could also help 
stabilizing national economies in the European South and other periphery countries 
(between 0.5-1 GDP increase possible), improve energy security (especialy for 
Greece, Ireland and Italy), and possibly improve employment opportunities - 
depending on the assumed baseline macro-economic policy (Section 3). Economic 
justice considerations foster the understanding that a considerable part of required 
investments should be financed by economic-core European countries, which have 
benefited from the agglomeration dynamics of a unified European economic zone. 
While the overal evaluation is grounded in a broad cost-benefit analysis, a reduction 
in wel-quantifiable outcome metrics would be misleading. In fact, if a European 
energy transition would show results, a renewed solidarity between European 
citizens could be the most valuable result even if hard to quantify in monetary or 
other economic units. 
In the second part of this paper (Section 4), we analyze barriers and policy 
options towards realizing the benefits of a European energy transition. A key result 
is that barriers in many countries are combinations of economic and administrative 
obstacles: deployment costs, e.g. of photovoltaic systems, are often considerably 
higher than those in central European countries. Technology prices are dominated 
by world markets and do not cause this divergence. Rather, our analysis suggests 
that administrative procedures, often lengthy and complicated, but also lack of 
skiled labor capacity, and missing straight-forward financing schemes are at the 
center of the prohibitively high costs. Hence, a transfer of streamlined administrative 
procedures, labor skils, and financing schemes could support a country-specific 
acceleration of the learning curve, decreasing prices for renewables but especialy 
solar. Overal, the policy analysis suggests that the country and even locality 
specific circumstances require member-state policies. European regulation and 
financing could then play an important supporting and coordination role. Crucialy, 
a tighter cap of the European ETS would not only incentivize a faster transition to 
renewables, but could also serve as an important source of financing renewable 
deployment for cash-starved recession countries. Direct financial support could be 
focused on decreasing the soft costs of renewables, by streamlining administrative 
procedures and building up deployment capacity (training programs, financing 
schemes). Loans with low-interests rates from the EIB could leverage additional 
investments. 
In summary, the analysis of this paper suggests that a climate-mitigation 
motivated European energy transition can also be understood as part of a strategy 
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that counteracts the European recession and tentatively balances out its structural
problems. The success of such a strategy must be seen with caution and depends on 
crucial implementation details. The advantage of providing a common rather than a 
fragmented European agenda, however, provides reason for optimism – a European 
energy transition could catch two European birds (climate change mitigation and 
relieving the deep recession) by one renewable stone.  
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